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Hydrogen fuel cell vehicle safety generally focuses on three areas of vehicle safety: The fuel, 
the storage system, and the vehicle itself. This presentation will give an overview using the 
Opel HydroGen4, equipped with a 70 MPa compressed hydrogen storage system, as an 
example [1]. 
Like any fuel, hydrogen has a significant amount of chemical energy which will be released 
upon ignition if an oxidizer such as oxygen is available. In air, mixtures between 4 vol% H2 
(lower flammability limit, LFL) and 74 vol% H2 (upper flammability limit, UFL) are ignitable [2]. 
An unintended release of hydrogen itself is not a threat as hydrogen is not toxic, but the 
possible risk of ignition needs to be considered in the safety assessment. 
For gasoline-driven vehicles, gasoline fuel leaks can be detected in two ways. First, it is a 
fluid and leakages are directly visible. Second, gasoline has a characteristic smell so that 
some discharges may also be detected directly. In contrast, hydrogen gas is invisible and 
odorless. However, depending on the storage technology, additional signs of leakage may be 
noticeable [3]. For example, for high-pressure storage systems a leak in the high-pressure 
section is audible, and for liquid hydrogen systems, leakages could be visible. In any event, 
hydrogen sensors are used to detect hydrogen at concentration levels higher than the 
specific target values. In the future, by odorizing the hydrogen fuel or advanced process 
monitoring methods, it may be possible that hydrogen sensors will no longer be necessary. 
The severity of a possible ignition is predominantly proportional to the total mass of released 
hydrogen. However, the released mass cannot be determined easily as a hydrogen sensor 
detects the concentration of hydrogen only. Therefore, it is possible that a very small mass of 
hydrogen released causes a concentration detected above the ignition threshold, even 
though the actual average concentration is lower than the ignition threshold.  Due to its 
buoyancy and diffusivity, the released hydrogen could spread in a way that only a very small 
area exceeds LFL. Moreover, the LFL limit is applicable to laboratory conditions and marks 
the transition from the region where no ignition is possible to the region where ignition is 
barely possible under some conditions. Thus, for a detailed study, in particular the flame 
propagation needs to be taken into account [4]. Considering dynamic and usual automotive 
environmental conditions, the actual sustainable ignition threshold is significantly above LFL 
[5,6]. 
On board the HydroGen4 fuel cell vehicle, there are seven hydrogen sensors for hydrogen 
leakage supervision. If the onboard supervision system detects hydrogen concentrations 
exceeding the threshold values, a hydrogen warning mode is enabled. The vehicle driver is 
notified by visible and audible signals, and fuel supply from the hydrogen storage system is 
shut down by closing shutoff valves. However, the driver needs to safely park the vehicle and 
therefore, propulsion needs to be available. Hence, propulsion in the hydrogen warning 
mode is provided by using the vehicle’s high-voltage traction battery. 
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Figure 1: Location of hydrogen sensors onboard the HydroGen4. 
There are two challenges for the onboard supervision system: First, leakages must be 
detected in a timely manner. Therefore, the sensors need to be placed at selected locations. 
For the HydroGen4, great care has been spent in validation testing and concentration 
threshold assessment to define those locations. For example, the Background Oriented 
Schlieren Method has been refined and applied to study vehicle-level hydrogen dispersion in 
great detail (Figure 2) [7]. As a result, hydrogen sensors have been placed at the four 
locations shown in Figure 1. Second, the sensor functionality needs to be verified anytime. 
As under normal operating conditions no hydrogen concentration is detected, it is impossible 
to perform a sensor check without additional measures like e.g. hydrogen test gas which 
could be applied in regular vehicle service checks. Therefore, hydrogen sensors with very 
high reliability must be used and critical locations are currently supervised with redundant 
sensors. 
 
Figure 2: Background Oriented Schlieren (BOS) technique to assess hydrogen dispersion. 
In terms of safety, the main task of any hydrogen storage system is to contain and seal the 
hydrogen. The shutoff approach applies to failure detection in normal operating condition and 
to vehicle crash situations. To provide the vessel integrity under very harsh conditions, there 
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are several tests required by applicable safety codes including permeation testing, drop 
testing (Figure 3), vibration testing, extreme temperature testing, bonfire and gunfire testing. 
Most of the tests are to validate vessel performance under usual operating conditions over 
the vehicle’s life, i.e. testing under very harsh conditions and validating the system’s 
performance under these conditions. However, the bonfire test and the gunfire test are of 
destructive nature and assess functionality under worst case assumptions. The bonfire test is 
designed to verify that during vehicle fires affecting the vessel’s integrity, the vessels are 
depressurized by an intended hydrogen release. In the gunfire test, the vessel is penetrated 
by a bullet. It is a test to verify that after vessel penetration, there is just a discharge of 
hydrogen rather than a vessel rupture. However, integrated in a vehicle, vessel penetration 
of the storage system is very unlikely even during extreme vehicle accidents. Even though 
the HydroGen4 withstands severe impact conditions, an additional internal test program for 
the storage vessels has been initiated. Several vessels have been tested against extreme 
impact conditions at various hydrogen pressures up to 70 MPa. In this test program, all 





Figure 3: Drop test of HydroGen4 storage vessel. 
Concerning Hydrogen Safety, Fuel cell vehicles need to meet the applicable regulations, in 
particular the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards FMVSS 208 and FMVSS 301 for the 
U.S. The HydroGen4 was designed from the beginning to meet these and other 
requirements. Extensive computer modeling and simulation has been performed together 
with accompanying component and subsystem tests. A final test according to FMVSS 208 
was run on full vehicle level with an operating fuel cell and hydrogen on board. Of particular 
interest from a hydrogen safety perspective is the rear crash as in this test, the storage 
system is exposed to external loads. In the rear crash according to FMVSS 301 (Figure 4), a 
barrier with a mass of 1368 kg hits the standing vehicle from the rear with 70% offset at a 
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speed of 80.5 km/h. Also this test was performed with the HydroGen4 and the vehicle 
sensing system worked successfully as expected. The main shutoff valves closed 
automatically thereby inhibiting any further external leakage. 
 
 
Figure 4: Schematic of barrier test according to FMVSS 301. 
In summary, safe onboard handling and storage of hydrogen is verified for fuel cell vehicles. 
Hydrogen leakages are detected by hydrogen sensors and tank system shutoff valves are 
closed automatically. Concerning Hydrogen Safety, the HydroGen4 meets all applicable 
regulations, in particular FMVSS 208 and FMVSS 301. In addition, the storage vessels have 
been tested for extreme impact conditions at various hydrogen pressures up to 70 MPa. 
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